Monitor, Detect, Mitigate: Combating BGP Prefix Hijacking in Real-Time
  with ARTEMIS by Sermpezis, Pavlos et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
05
70
2v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 19
 Se
p 2
01
6
Monitor, Detect, Mitigate: Combating BGP Prefix Hijacking
in Real-Time with ARTEMIS
Pavlos Sermpezis, Gavriil Chaviaras, Petros Gigis, and Xenofontas Dimitropoulos
FORTH, Greece
{sermpezis, gchaviaras, gkigkis, fontas}@ics.forth.gr
ABSTRACT
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is globally used by
Autonomous Systems (ASes) to establish route paths for IP
prefixes in the Internet. Due to the lack of authentication
in BGP, an AS can hijack IP prefixes owned by other ASes
(i.e., announce illegitimate route paths), impacting thus the
Internet routing system and economy. To this end, a number
of hijacking detection systems have been proposed. How-
ever, existing systems are usually third party services that
-inherently- introduce a significant delay between the hijack-
ing detection (by the service) and its mitigation (by the net-
work administrators). To overcome this shortcoming, in this
paper, we propose ARTEMIS, a tool that enables an AS to
timely detect hijacks on its own prefixes, and automatically
proceed to mitigation actions. To evaluate the performance
of ARTEMIS, we conduct real hijacking experiments. To
our best knowledge, it is the first time that a hijacking de-
tection/mitigation system is evaluated through extensive ex-
periments in the real Internet. Our results (a) show that
ARTEMIS can detect (mitigate) a hijack within a few sec-
onds (minutes) after it has been launched, and (b) demon-
strate the efficiency of the different control-plane sources
used by ARTEMIS, towards monitoring routing changes.
1. INTRODUCTION
The inter-domain routing in the Internet takes place over
the -globally adopted- Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1].
Autonomous Systems (ASes) use BGP to advertise routing
paths for IP prefixes to their neighboring ASes. Since BGP is
a distributed protocol and authentication of advertised routes
is not always feasible, it is possible for an AS to advertise il-
legitimate route paths for IP prefixes. These paths can prop-
agate and “infect” many ASes, or even the entire Internet,
impacting thus severely the Internet routing system and/or
economy [2–6].
This phenomenon, called BGP prefix hijacking, is frequently
observed [6], and usually caused by router misconfigura-
tions [2, 3] or malicious attacks [4–6]. Some examples of
real BGP hijacking cases include: (a) a Pakistan’s ISP in
2008, due to a misconfiguration, hijacked the YouTube’s pre-
fixes and disrupted its services for more than 2 hours [2]; (b)
China Telecom mistakenly announced ∼ 37000 IP prefixes
(corresponding to 15% of the whole BGP table) in 2010,
causing routing problems in the Internet [3]; and (c) hack-
ers performed several hijacking attacks, through a Canadian
ISP, to redirect traffic and steal thousands dollars worth of
bitcoins in 2014 [4].
To prevent prefix hijackings, several proactive mechanisms
for enhancing the BGP security have been proposed [7–11].
These mechanisms need to be globally deployed to be ef-
fective. However, despite the standardization efforts [9, 10],
their deployment is slow due to political, technical, and eco-
nomic challenges, leaving thus the Internet vulnerable to
BGP hijacks.
Therefore, currently, reactive mechanisms are used for de-
fending against prefix hijackings: after a hijacking is de-
tected, network administrators are notified (e.g, through mail-
ing lists [12], or dedicated services [13]), in order to proceed
to manual actions towards its mitigation (e.g., reconfigure
routers, or contact other ASes to filter announcements). A
number of systems have been proposed for detecting prefix
hijacking, based on control plane (i.e., BGP data) and/or data
plane (i.e,. pings/traceroutes) information [12–18]. Most of
them, are designed to operate as third-party services (exter-
nal to an AS) that monitor the Internet, and upon the de-
tection of a suspicious incident, notify the involved ASes.
Although this approach has been shown to be able to detect
suspicious routing events in many cases, two main issues
still remain unsolved: (i) the detection might not be accurate,
since the suspicious routing events might not correspond to
hijacks, but be caused by, e.g., traffic engineering; and (ii)
the mitigation is not automated, increasing thus significantly
the time needed to resolve a hijack.
In this paper, we propose a reactive mechanism/system,
which we call ARTEMIS (Automatic and Real-Time dEtec-
tion and MItigation System)1, that aims to be operated by
an AS itself, rather than a third-party, to timely detect and
mitigate hijackings against its own prefixes in an automatic
way. ARTEMIS (i) exploits the most recent advances in
control-plane monitoring to detect in near real-time prefix
hijackings, and (ii) immediately proceeds to their automatic
mitigation (Section 2).
We then conduct several real hijacking experiments in the
1A demo of ARTEMIS is to appear in ACM Sigcomm 2016 [19].
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Internet using the PEERING testbed and analyze the effect
of various network parameters (like, type of hijacking, hi-
jacker / defender-AS location and connectivity) on the per-
formance of ARTEMIS. We show that it is possible to detect
and mitigate prefix hijacking within few seconds from the
moment the offending announcement is first made. This is a
major improvement compared to present approaches, which
require slow procedures, like manual verification and coor-
dination. The timely mitigation of ARTEMIS, prevents a
hijacking from spreading to just, e.g., 20%-50% of the ASes
that would be affected otherwise (Section 3).
Finally, we discuss related work in hijacking detection
systems and measurement studies, and compare it to our
study, in order to highlight the new capabilities that are of-
fered with ARTEMIS (Section 4). We conclude our paper
by discussing the potential for future applications and exten-
sions of ARTEMIS (Section 5).
2. ARTEMIS
In this section, we first present the different sources that
are used by ARTEMIS for control-plane monitoring (Sec-
tion 2.1), and then describe the detection (Section 2.2) and
mitigation (Section 2.3) services.
2.1 Control-Plane Data Sources
For the monitoring service, ARTEMIS combines multi-
ple control-plane sources to (a) accelerate the detection of a
hijacking (i.e., minimum time of all sources), and (b) have
a more complete view of the Internet (i.e., from the van-
tage points of all the sources). ARTEMIS receives control-
plane information from publicly available sources, namely,
the BGPmon tool [15], the live-streaming service of RIPE-
RIS [20], and the Periscope platform [21].
Remark: ARTEMIS supports the BGPstream tool [22] as
well. However, during our experiments, the BGPstream ser-
vice was unavailable, and, thus, we do not use it in this paper.
In the following, we present the main features of these
control-plane sources.
BGPmon [15] is a tool that monitors BGP routing infor-
mation in real-time. It is connected to, and collects BGP
updates and routing tables (RIBs) from BGP routers of: (a)
the RouteViews sites and (b) a few dozen of peers around
the world; at the time we conducted our study, BGPmon had
43 vantage points, in total. BGPmon provides the live BGP
data, as an XML stream.
RIPE RIS streaming service [20]. The RIPE’s Routing
Information System (RIS) is connected to route collectors
(RCs) in several locations around the world, and collects
BGP updates and RIBs. In the standard RIPE RIS [23],
the data can be accessed via the raw files (in MRT format)
or RIPEstat. The delay for BGP updates is ∼ 5min and
∼ 8h for RIBs. Recently, RIPE RIS offers a streaming ser-
vice [20] that provides live information from 4 RCs via web-
sockets. The live streaming service of RIPE RIS, which we
use in ARTEMIS, has currently 3 RCs in Europe and 1 RC
in Africa; all of them are located in large IXPs.
Periscope [21] is a platform that provides a common in-
terface for issuing measurements from Looking Glass (LG)
servers. Through Periscope, a user can send a command to a
number of chosen LGs to ask for control-plane (show ip bgp)
or data-plane (traceroute/ping) information. The status and
the output of the measurements can be retrieved at any time
(even before its completion). Periscope currently provides
access to 1691 LG servers.
BGPstream [22] is an open-source framework for live
(and historical) BGP data analysis. It enables users to quickly
inspect raw BGP data from the command-line, or through a
Python and C/C++ API. BGPstream provides live access to
RouteViews and RIPE RIS data archives. While the delay
of acquiring the data from these two services is consider-
able (5min and 15min, respectively, for BGP updates), BG-
Pstream recently introduced a service for live access to a
stream of BGP data from BMP-enabled RouteViews collec-
tors (with only ∼ 1min delay). In total, BGPstream receives
data from 76 route collectors, from all its providers.
2.2 Prefix Hijacking Detection with ARTEMIS
The detection service of ARTEMIS aims to detect hijacks
in (i) real-time and (ii) without false positives, while moni-
toring the (iii) entire Internet in a (iv) light-weight fashion.
The detection service continuously receives from the 3
control-plane sources (see Section 2.1) information about
the BGP route paths for the monitored prefixes, as they are
seen at the different vantage points (e.g., route collectors,
LG servers). This routing information is compared with a
local file that defines the legitimate origin-ASNs for each IP
prefix that is owned by the operator of ARTEMIS; any viola-
tion denotes a hijacking. Since operator has full knowledge
on the legitimate origin-ASNs for its prefixes, the detection
service returns no false positives.
With the combination of 3 sources, the detection can take
place when an illegitimate route path is received by any of
the sources. This is always faster than using only one source,
and can decrease the time needed for detection. Using mul-
tiple sources gives also the possibility to benefit from the
large number of vantage points they have around the globe.
This is important, because a hijacking might affect only a
part of the Internet, due to BGP policies and shortest-path
routing [12, 24].
Finally, ARTEMIS aims to impose limited load on the
used third-party services, so that potentially 100s ASes (that
run ARTEMIS) could use them in parallel. ARTEMIS needs
to receive only the data (i.e., the part of the BGP tables, or
specific BGP updates) that correspond to the local prefixes.
As a result, the imposed load is low, since (a) BGPmon and
RIPE RIS (as well as, BGPstream) are services/tools de-
signed and optimized to provide streams of live data to many
users simultaneously, (b) and Periscope has already a limit
in the rate of requests to avoid overloading of LG servers.
Similarly, the consumption of network resources is very low,
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allowing thus a single AS to monitor many prefixes.
2.3 Automatic Prefix Hijacking Mitigation
The goals of a mitigation mechanism are to be (i) fast and
(ii) efficient, and (iii) have low impact on the Internet routing
system.
Currently mitigation relies on manual actions, e.g., after a
network administrator is notified for a prefix hijacking, she
proceeds to reconfiguration of the BGP routers, or contacts
other administrators to filter the hijacker’s announcements.
As it becomes evident, this manual intervention introduces a
significant delay (e.g., in the YouTube hijacking incident in
2008 [2], a couple of hours were needed for the mitigation
of the problem). Hence, our primary focus is to accelerate
the mitigation. To this end, we implement an automatic mit-
igation mechanism, which starts the mitigation immediately
after the detection, i.e., without manual intervention.
Specifically, when ARTEMIS detects a hijacking in a pre-
fix, let 10.0.0.0/23, it proceeds to its de-aggregation: it sends
a command to the BGP routers of the AS to announce the
two more-specific prefixes, i.e., 10.0.0.0/24 and 10.0.1.0/24.
The sub-prefixes will disseminate in the Internet and re-establish
legitimate route paths, since more specific prefixes are pre-
ferred by BGP. Prefix de-aggregation, as described above,
is efficient for /23 or less specific (i.e., /22, /21, ...) pre-
fixes. However, when it comes to hijacking of /24 prefixes,
the de-aggregation might not be always efficient, since pre-
fixes more specific than /24 are filtered by most routers [25].
Although this is a shortcoming of the de-aggregation mech-
anism, it is not possible to overcome it in an automatic way
(manual actions are needed); to our best knowledge, only so-
lutions that require the cooperation of more than one ASes
could be applied [26, 27].
The de-aggregation mechanism of ARTEMIS, increments
the number of entries in the BGP routing table by 1 per hi-
jacked prefix. However, since the number of concurrent hi-
jackings is not expected to be large, and the duration of a
hijacking is limited, the imposed overhead is low.
Finally, since ARTEMIS monitors continuously the control-
plane of the Internet, from many vantage points, it becomes
possible to monitor in real-time the process of the mitigation.
This enables a network administrator to see how efficient
the mitigation is, and if needed to proceed to further (e.g.,
manual) actions or to rely exclusively on the de-aggregation
mechanism.
3. EVALUATION WITH A REAL AS
In this section, we conduct experiments in the Internet,
to investigate (a) the overall performance of ARTEMIS, and
(b) the efficiency of the different sources presented in Sec-
tion 2.1 for monitoring the control-plane of the Internet. In
Section 3.1 we provide the details for the setup of our exper-
iments, and present the results in Section 3.2.
3.1 Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we conduct real hijackings in the In-
ternet. We use the PEERING testbed [28, 29], which pro-
vides the possibility to announce IP prefixes from real ASNs
to the Internet; both the IP prefixes and the ASNs are owned
by PEERING, hence, our experiments have no impact on the
connectivity of other ASes.
Specifically, we create a virtual AS in PEERING, and con-
nect it to one or more real networks. This AS (which we call
“legitimate” AS) announces an IP prefix and uses ARTEMIS
to continuously monitor this prefix. We also create another
virtual AS (the “hijacker” AS) in PEERING, connect it to a
real network in a different location, and hijack the prefix of
the legitimate AS.
3.1.1 The PEERING testbed
PEERING is a testbed that enables researchers to interact
with the Internet’s routing system. It connects with several
real networks at universities and Internet exchange points
around the world. The users of PEERING can announce IP
prefixes using multiple ASNs owned by PEERING as the
origin-AS.
In our experiments, we use the connections of PEERING
to three real networks/sites (Table 1)2. We are given autho-
rization to announce the prefix 184.164.228.0/23 (as well as,
its sub-prefixes), and use the AS numbers 61574 (for the le-
gitimate AS) and 61575 (for the hijacker AS).
3.1.2 Types of prefix hijacking attack
We test ARTEMIS in two different types of hijacking at-
tacks: (a) exact prefix hijacks, and (b) sub-prefix hijacks.
Exact prefix hijacking is a common attack type where
the hijacker announces the same prefix that is announced
by the legitimate AS. Since shortest route paths are typi-
cally preferred, only a part of the Internet that is closer to
the hijacker (in number of AS-hops) switches to route paths
towards the hijacker. Exact prefix hijacks typically infect a
few tens or hundreds of ASes [12], from small stub networks
to large tier-1 ISPs [24]. In our experiments, the legitimate
AS announces the prefix 184.164.228.0/23; then the hijacker
announces the same prefix. To mitigate the attack, the legit-
imate AS, announces the sub-prefixes 184.164.228.0/24 and
184.164.229.0/24.
Sub-prefix hijacking contributes around 10% of all sta-
ble hijackings in the Internet [12]. The hijacker announces
a more specific prefix, which is covered by the prefix of the
legitimate AS. Since in BGP more specific prefixes are pre-
ferred, the entire Internet switches to routing towards the hi-
jacker for the announced sub-prefix. We configure ARTEMIS
to monitor the 184.164.228.0/22 prefix3. The hijacker an-
nounces the prefix 184.164.228.0/23. The attack is mitigated
2PEERING peers with 88 organizations in AMS-IX [29]. Statistics
for the number providers, customers, and peers for each AS are
from [30].
3Since we have access only to the /23 prefix, we do not announce
the /22 prefix; we only assume it is announced. However, this does
not affect the outcome of the experiments.
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Table 1: PEERING sites
Organization Location ASN #providers #customers #peers
AMS Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX) Amsterdam, NL 1200 - - 509
ISI Los Nettos Regional Network Los Angeles (CA), US 226 4 19 19
GAT Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta (GA), US 2637 4 1 6
by de-aggregating the hijacked prefix, i.e., the legitimate AS
announces the two /24 prefixes.
3.1.3 Experiments
The experiment process comprises the following steps:
(1) The legitimate AS (AS61574) announces the IP prefix,
and we wait 20min for BGP convergence.
(2) The hijacker AS (AS61575) announces the IP prefix (or,
sub-prefix).
(3) ARTEMIS detects the hijacking.
(4) ARTEMIS starts the mitigation, i.e., the legitimate AS
announces the de-aggregated sub-prefixes.
(5) We monitor the mitigation process for 30min, and end
the experiment by withdrawing all announcements.
We conduct experiments for a number of different sce-
narios, varying the (a) location/site of the legitimate and hi-
jacker ASes, and (b) number of upstream providers of the le-
gitimate AS. We repeat each scenario/experiment 10 times.
The experiments took place in May-June 2016.
Remark: While normally ARTEMIS proceeds immediately
after a hijacking detection to its mitigation, in some experi-
ments we add a 30min delay between steps 3 and 4, i.e., we
defer the mitigation. This allows us to investigate the effi-
ciency of the different control-plane sources, i.e., how much
time each of them needs to detect the hijacking.
3.1.4 Configuration of the control-plane sources
BGPmon provides to ARTEMIS a stream of all the up-
dates it receives from its peers. Hence, configuration is not
needed; filtering and detection are internal services of ARTEMIS.
RIPE RIS needs only the information about the monitored
prefix, and returns to ARTEMIS only the BGP messages that
correspond to announcements for this prefix.
In Periscope, due to the limit on the rate of measurements
per user, only a subset of the total 1691 LG servers can be
used. To conform to the rate-limit, we use 18 LG servers,
which we select based on their performance (response time,
availability) and location. The selected set consists of 11 LGs
in Europe, 2 in Asia, 4 in North America, and 1 in Australia.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Performance of control-plane sources
The performance of ARTEMIS depends on the control-
plane sources it uses. Therefore, to obtain an initial under-
standing about the capabilities and limitations of ARTEMIS,
we present in Fig. 1 experimental results that demonstrate
the efficiency and characteristics of the different control-
plane sources in hijacking detection (Fig. 1(a)) and mitiga-
tion monitoring (Fig. 1(b)).
Fig. 1(a) shows how much time is needed by BGPmon,
RIPE RIS, and Periscope to observe an illegitimate route,
after it has been announced from the hijacker AS. We present
the distribution of the times (among different experiments)
for both attack types: prefix and sub-prefix hijacking.
A first observation is that the streaming services (BGP-
mon and RIPE RIS) observe the hijack in ≤ 1min in most
cases, and are significantly faster than Periscope (1-2min),
which monitors the control-plane by periodically issuing mea-
surements from LG servers. This is due to the response delay
of the LGs, as well as, a limit in the minimum time interval
between consequent measurements imposed by Periscope.
The detection delay in the sub-prefix attack case (SP) is
-on average- lower than in prefix hijacking (P). This is be-
cause a sub-prefix hijacking appears in the whole Internet,
whereas prefix hijacking affects only a fraction of it. This
partial infection of the Internet can be faster observed by
BGPmon that has more vantage points than RIPE RIS, as is
indicated by the lower mean value and variance of BGPmon
in the prefix hijacking case.
In Fig. 1(b), we show the mitigation progress as it has
been observed by the ASes with a vantage point, i.e., an RC
feed or an LG server, in all sources. The average number of
ASes that have been infected by the hijacker and switched
back to the legitimate routes, are 29 and 15 in the SP and P
case, respectively. Despite the differences, both attacks can
be quickly mitigated; 45% (SP) and 50% (P) of the ASes re-
establish legitimate routes in 10sec after the mitigation was
launched, while almost complete mitigation is achieved in
less than 1min. Furthermore, Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) hint to an
interesting trade-off: more vantage points (and, thus, ASes)
can be monitored by Periscope, however, this comes with
an increase in the detection delay compared to BGPmon and
RIPE RIS.
3.2.2 Effect of network connectivity
We now proceed to test the efficiency of ARTEMIS un-
der various scenarios of network connectivity. Fig. 2 illus-
trates the effect of the (i) hijacker site and (ii) number of
upstream providers of the legitimate AS4. In the prefix hi-
jacking case (Fig. 2(a)), when the hijacking is triggered by a
well connected site, as in the case of AMS that it peers with
88 real networks, the detection of the hijacking can be done
in around 10sec. When the connectivity of the hijacker AS
4Our results do not significantly variate with the location of the
legitimate AS or the number of upstream providers of the hijacker.
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Figure 1: (a) Boxplots of the detection delay of the different
control-plane sources among all the prefix (P) and sub-prefix
(SP) hijacking experiments. (b) Number of ASes (with a
vantage point) that switched back to the legitimate AS (y-
axis) vs. the time the mitigation has been launched (x-axis).
is low, as in the GAT case that there are less than a dozen of
directly connected networks, the detection delay is always
higher than 15sec and can need up to 1min (the average de-
tection delay is around 30sec). These findings are intuitive
and consistent with the conclusions of the simulation study
in [24]; adding to this, they quantify for the first time the
effects of the hijacker’s connectivity with real experiments.
In Fig. 2(a), we can also observe that when the connectiv-
ity of the legitimate AS increases, i.e., 2 upstream providers,
the detection delay (slightly) increases as well. This is due to
the fact that with 2 upstream providers, more ASes are closer
to the legitimate AS (in terms of AS-hops) than the hijacker,
and thus the effect of prefix hijacking is lower (and, conse-
quently, its detection becomes more difficult).
In contrast to the prefix hijacking case, when the hijacker
announces a sub-prefix (Fig. 2(b)), the connectivity of the
involved networks does not play a crucial role. The effect of
the hijacking is large and the detection is always completed
within 10sec, and on average it needs only 3sec!
Remark: In [12] it is shown that the “detection delay” of
Argus (a state-of-the-art hijacking detection system) is less
than 10sec for > 60% hijacks. However, this delay, let Tdd,
refers to the time needed to infer that an observation of an
illegitimate route corresponds to a hijacking attack; i.e., if
Argus uses the same control-plane sources as ARTEMIS, the
total detection delay of Argus is TArgus = TARTEMIS +
Tdd ≥ TARTEMIS .
3.2.3 Gains of automatic mitigation
After presenting the hijacking detection efficiency, we study
the gains of the automatic mitigation of ARTEMIS. Specif-
ically, Fig. 3 shows the percentage of infected ASes in re-
lation to the time since the hijacking has been launched.
Each curve corresponds to a different “mitigation start time”
Tstart, i.e., the time between the hijacker’s announcement
and the de-aggregation. The two bottom lines5 correspond
5With blue and red; or, 10sec and 30sec in Fig. 3(a), and 5sec and
10sec in Fig. 3(b).
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Figure 2: Boxplots of ARTEMIS detection delay in scenar-
ios with different hijacker location and number of upstream
providers of the legitimate AS. Results for the cases of (a)
prefix and (b) sub-prefix hijacking.
0 50 100 150 200 2500
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f i
nf
ec
te
d 
AS
es
time (sec)
 
 
10sec
30sec
1min
2min
(a) prefix hijacking
0 50 100 150 200 2500
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f i
nf
ec
te
d 
AS
es
time (sec)
 
 
5sec
10sec
1min
2min
(b) sub-prefix hijacking
Figure 3: Percentage of “infected” ASes (seen by the
control-plane sources), i.e., ASes that route traffic to the hi-
jacker, (y-axis) vs. the time since the hijacking has been
launched (x-axis).
to the near real-time automatic mitigation with ARTEMIS
(we selected representative scenarios; cf. Fig. 2). The two
top lines are assumed to correspond to a timely (but not real-
time) mitigation, e.g., with manual actions.
As it can be seen, ARTEMIS can significantly decrease
the impact of a hijacking. For instance, in scenarios where
the detection delay of ARTEMIS is 10sec, the fraction of in-
fected ASes is 20% and 50% in the prefix and sub-prefix hi-
jacking, respectively, while even a timely mitigation starting
1min after the hijacking is not able to prevent the infection of
all ASes. Moreover, with ARTEMIS the attack is completely
mitigated in Ttotal ≤ 2min, whereas a mitigation that started
after all ASes are infected (i.e., top two lines) needs around
1.5min after the detection, i.e., Ttotal = Tstart + 1.5min.
This fast and effective mitigation that ARTEMIS can achieve,
is particularly important for short hijacking attacks, whose
frequency increases [12], and which can still cause serious
problems [4].
4. RELATED WORK
4.1 Detection of Prefix Hijacking
Detection mechanisms can be classified based on the type
of information they use for detecting prefix hijackings as: (i)
control-plane, (ii) data-plane, and (iii) hybrid approaches.
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Control-plane approaches [13–15] collect information, like
BGP updates or tables, from route servers and/or looking
glass servers (LGs), from which they detect incidents that
can be caused by prefix hijackings. When, for example, a
change in the origin-AS of a prefix, or a suspicious change
in a route path, is observed, an alarm is raised. Data plane
approaches [16,17] use ping/traceroute measurements to de-
tect a prefix hijacking. They continuously monitor the data
plane connectivity of a prefix and raise an alarm for hijack-
ing, when significant changes in the reachability of the pre-
fix [16] or in the paths leading to it [17], are observed. A
main shortcoming of data-plane mechanisms, is that a signif-
icant (minimum) number of active measurements is required
to safely characterise an event as hijacking. Hence, these
systems cannot be implemented in a light-weight fashion;
and if deployed by every AS, they could introduce a large
overhead [12]. Finally, hybrid approaches [12, 18] combine
control and data plane information to detect, with higher ac-
curacy [12], multiple types of prefix hijacking [12, 18].
Argus [12] is the most recent among the aforementioned
detection systems, and has few false positives/negatives, and
near real-time detection. However, Argus is based only on
BGPmon for control-plane information [15], whereas ARTEMIS
receives data from multiple sources (BGPmon, RIPE-RIS,
BGPstream, Periscope), which leads to a faster detection in
more than 60% of the cases (as we observed in our experi-
ments).
The main difference between ARTEMIS and previous de-
tection mechanisms is that most of the previous approaches
are notification systems. They are designed to be operated
by a third party and to monitor all the prefix the Internet.
Upon detection of a suspicious event, they notify the in-
volved ASes about a possible hijacking. This process has
two shortcomings: (a) it yields many false positives, since
suspicious events can usually be due to a number of legiti-
mate reasons, like traffic engineering, anycast, congestion of
the data-plane, etc.; and (b) it introduces significant delay,
between the detection and mitigation of an event, as the net-
work administrators of the involved AS need to be notified
and then have to manually verify the incident. On the con-
trary, ARTEMIS is designed to detect hijacks against owned
prefixes (for which the origin-AS information is known) and
thus, overcomes the accuracy limitations, and eliminates the
notification/verification delay.
Among previous works, only [16] is designed for detec-
tion of hijacks against owned prefixes. However, it is a
pure data-plane mechanism, which as discussed above, in-
troduces significant overhead (especially, if deployed by many
ASes). In contrast, ARTEMIS, which is a pure control-
plane mechanism, can be deployed simultaneously in many
ASes without significant overhead for the control-plane re-
sources/tools (see discussion in Section 2.2). At the time the
first of these mechanisms were proposed, the capability of
the available BGP feeds for providing real-time information
was limited. However, currently there exist several state-
of-the-art publicly available control-plane sources/tools [15,
20, 22, 31] that enable pure control-plane mechanisms, like
ARTEMIS, to detect a prefix hijacking event in near real-
time (a few seconds [15, 20], or minutes [31], as we show in
Section 3). To our best knowledge ARTEMIS is the first ap-
proach to exploit the streaming interfaces of RIPE RIS [20]
and Periscope [31] for prefix hijacking detection.
4.2 Measurement Studies
Previous studies have taken measurements either over real
hijacking incidents that happened in the Internet [12, 24, 32]
or through simulations [16,17,24,26]. While the former cor-
respond to the behavior of the Internet and capture the real
effects of hijacking, they are limited to the investigation of a
few known incidents, which do not span all possible cases.
The latter are able to perform an investigation over a wider
range of scenarios and study the effect of different parame-
ters, but do not capture accurately real-world effects, since
the topology, routing, and policies of the Internet cannot be
perfectly replicated in simulations. Moreover, due to the ab-
sence of the ground-truth, i.e., if a detected routing change
is indeed a hijacking or not, previous studies refer to third
party sources, e.g., the Route Origin Authorizations (ROA)
or Internet Routing Registries (IRR), for the validation of
their results. However, such information is usually incom-
plete and/or inaccurate [12], and, this might have an impact
on the findings. Closer to our study is [16] that tested its
performance in self-triggered hijacks (for self-owned pre-
fixes) in the Internet. Nevertheless, only few experiments
(15 hijacks) were conducted, whereas in this paper we con-
duct a large number of experiments (spread over 4 weeks)
with varying network parameters (location and connectivity
of the hijacking/legitimate AS) and types of hijacks.
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented ARTEMIS, a system for near real-
time detection and automatic mitigation of BGP hijacking
attacks. The evaluation with extensive real hijacking exper-
iments, showed that ARTEMIS can detect hijacks in a few
seconds, and completely mitigate them in less than 2min.
In this initial implementation of ARTEMIS, we detect origin-
AS inconsistencies in route paths, and combat them using the
prefix de-aggregation method. Although not a panacea, pre-
fix de-aggregation can be also effective for adjacency / pol-
icy [12] or last-hop anomalies [13], or even path interception
attacks [33]. To extend ARTEMIS towards this direction, it
suffices to modify only the detection algorithm; the monitor-
ing and mitigation services can remain intact.
Finally, since the detection service of ARTEMIS is built
on top (and, independently) of the monitoring service, the
employed monitoring methodology and results (e.g., Fig. 1)
are generic and can be useful in a number of application re-
lated to control-plane monitoring, e.g., to provide visibility
to an AS of the impact of the routing changes it triggers (any-
casting, traffic engineering, etc).
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